Intentional Torts
I. Battery - R2T
§ 13, 18: Liable for battery if (a) there is intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or an imminent apprehension of
such contact, and (b) a harmful [or offensive] contact directly or indirectly results.
A. Elements for Prima Facie Case of Battery
a. Act
by Defendant
b. Intent
c. Harmful or Offensive
touching
d. Causation
e. Lack
of Consent
B. Requiring Fault
a. Van Camp
v. McAfoos -
Child riding tricycle hits pedestrian. Not liable – No fault.
C. Elements
of Battery
a. Liable for battery when
(1) D acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact, and (2) when a harmful contact results.
The least touching of another in anger is battery.
1. Snyder
v. Turk –
Dr pulls nurse’s face towards operation opening in anger.
b. D
also liable not relatively trivial contacts which are merely offensive and insulting (protecting personal integrity). Contact
which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is offensive contact.
1. Cohen v. Smith – male nurse saw and touched P’s naked body,
which was against her religious beliefs (P had informed D). Liable – offensive touching.
2. Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications,
Inc. –
intentional blowing of smoke in P’s face; D liable for battery. Offensive contact.
a. Employer only responsible for torts of
employees if employee is acting under scope of employment.
D. Intent
- R3T §1: A person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with
the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to
result.
a. Substantial certainty
of result can provide required intent
1. Garrat
v. Dailey –
Child pulls chair out from under p; P falls. Even though D doesn’t desire to harm P, if D knows there is a substantial
certainty P will be harmed, then intent element of battery is satisfied.
b. Transferred
intent – (1) tortfeasers intends tort on A, but commits tort on B; (2) tortfeasers intends a tort, but
accomplishes another one.
1. Hall v.
McBryde
- D shot gun at passenger in car, D accidently shot P, pedestrian. No intent to shoot P, but use transferred intent.
2. Extended Liability – D commits intentional
tort; liable for all damages resulting, not merely those intended or foreseeable
c. Child Liability –
Most states children still liable for torts. Some states have an age cut-off where children will be held liable (b/c presumed
small children incapable of the required intent). Standard of care (to find negligence) of minor
is that ordinarily used by similar children of same age.
1. Parental Liability for the torts of their minor children –
depends on statute (state will enact usually if willful/wanton tort, and damages capped at a low amt $); common law says parents
not vicariously for torts of their children.
d. Insanity
- R2T §895J - One who has deficient mental capacity is not immune from tort liability solely for that reason.
1. Polmatier v. Russ – D insane at time he murdered P.
Still liable, b/c he intended to harm him, although the reasoning for it was irrational.
e. In a “dual intent” jurisdiction, the
fact of insanity may be considered when determining whether an insane defendant appreciated the harmfulness/offensiveness
of his/her conduct.
1. White
v. Muniz –
Dementia patient (w/ loss of memory, impulse control & judgment) hits caregiver. No intent
b/c D couldn’t appreciate the harm of her conduct, due to her dementia.
II. Assault – R2T §21 An actor
is subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or an imminent
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension.
A. Elements for Prima Facie Case for Assault
a. Act
by Defendant
b. Intent
c. Apprehension of immediate
touching
d. Causation
e. Lack
of Consent
B. No contact required for assault
a. Cullison v. Medley- Ds intended to frighten P, by surrounding
him and threatening him with bodily harm with a revolver. P suffers chest pains & psychological trauma.
C. Some apprehension
of the imminent contact is required for assault
a. Koffman
v. Garnett –
D (football coach) tackled P, while explaining a technique, and accidently broke P’s bone. No assault b/c no time for
P to apprehend the imminent danger. Once coach tackled him, the battery was already in progress.
1. R2T §29(1) The apprehension created must
be one of imminent contact, as distinguished from any contact in the future. “Imminent”
does not mean immediate, in the sense of instantaneous contact . . . . It means rather that there will be no significant delay.
III. False Imprisonment – R2T §35 Liability for false imprisonment
if (a) D acts intending to confine within boundaries fixed by D, and (b) D’s act directly or indirectly results in such
a confinement, and (c) P is conscious of the confinement or is harmed by it.
A. Elements for Prima Facie Case:
a. Act
by defendant
b. Intent
c. Confinement without lawful privilege for
any appreciable time
d. Causation
e. Lack
of consent
B. Physical confinement is not required; the
confinement element of false imprisonment can be shown by other factual circumstances
a. McCann v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. – mere threats (can be implicit or explicit) of physical
force can suffice; confinement can also be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine.
IV. Torts to Property
A. Trespass
to Land – R2T §158: A trespasser is liable, even if no harm is caused, if he intentionally (a) enters another’s
land or causes a thing or person to, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he is
under a duty to remove.
B. Trespass
to Chattels
– R2T §217: (Chattels are personal property). Trespass to chattels is the intentional dispossession, use or intermeddling
of another’s chattel. With trespass to chattels, you must show actual damages.
C. Conversion of Chattels – R2T §222A: Conversion
is when property is interfered with the owner’s control of it in a “complete or very substantial” way, and
owner can get the value (but not the thing back). Factors in determining the extent of interference and if actor must
pay back owner: (a) extent & duration of actor’s control over chattel, (b) actor’s
intent to take away owner’s control, (c) actor’s good faith, (d) harm done to chattel, (e) inconvenience &
expense caused to the owner.
V. Forcible Harms as Civil
Rights Violations
A. The §1983 Claim (Summary):
Every person shall be liable to the party injured under the following circumstances: (1) when that person deprives the party
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and (federal) laws, and (2) does so under color of state
or other local law.
a. Yang v.
Hardin –
forcible harm against Yang by police officer Brown. Hardin there but didn’t interfere. D’s failure to interfere
deprived Yang of his civil rights.
b. Brown v. Muhlenberg Township – D (police officer) shot and killed P’s dog, who was not posing
any imminent danger. Unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the 4th amendment.
B. Exemplars of Constitutional Violations
a. 4th Amendment - The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures
b. 14th Amendment - no deprivation
of life, liberty or happiness without due process
c. 8th Amendment - Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
d. County of Sacramento v. Lewis – suspect killed
in police chase. P alleges rights under 14th amendment. No intent to injure; recklessness insufficient to show
a due process violation.
VI.
Affirmative
Defenses
A. Protecting Against the
Apparent Misconduct of the Plaintiff
a. Self-Defense –
R2T §70: There must be an immediate threat of harm to trigger the self-defense privilege.
You must have a reasonable belief that force is necessary, but you can be mistaken. You can use reasonable
force in amount and duration based on the circumstances to protect your person.
1. The force you use must be proportional in some sense.
2. Words are insufficient
provocation to trigger the privilege of self-defense because language doesn’t constitute assault.
3. You can only use deadly
force to counter deadly force.
4. In own home, no obligation
to retreat from deadly force. (but outside home, may be obligation to retreat from deadly force, but depends).
5. Non-deadly force: no obligation to retreat;
ok to respond w/non-deadly force
b. Defense of Third Persons
– R2T §83: if actor is privileged for the purpose of stopping a trespass or conversion, and in doing do, unintentionally
harms a 3rd person, actor not liable unless he knew or should have known of the risk created.
c. Temporary Detention for Investigation. R2T §120A – An actor is privileged
to detain someone whom he reasonably believes has taken his chattel or not paid for services, for time necessary for
reasonable investigation
1. Merchant privilege to
detain for investigation
a. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul
– P suspected of stealing. No reasonable belief for stealing (P wasn’t trying to leave store yet, D didn’t
actually see him take it, etc), so therefore no reasonable reason for the detention.
d. Defense and Repossession of Property -
1. R2T§ 77 - reasonable force and actor reasonably believes that the intrusion can be prevented or terminated only by the force
used ok if intrusion is not privileged. The force involved is limited in particular by the requirement that the trespasser
first be asked to depart, except when the intruder is acting in such a way that a reasonable person would find that such a
request is useless or can’t be made in time.
2. R2T § 79 - You do not
have the privilege to use force that may cause death or serious injury against trespassers unless the trespass itself threatens
death or serious injury. The value of human life outweighs possession of land.
3. R2T §85 – A possessor of land cannot do indirectly by using
a mechanical device, that which he could not do immediately and in person.
a. Katko v. Briney – mechanical gun set up to
shoot trespassers. D were not present, no threat of bodily harm, only possession of property. No
privilege to use this type of force.
b. Brown
v. Martinez –
P trespassed on D’s land; D shot P. Not shown that D feared for his safety. No privilege
to use gun.
4. Recovery of property
– only if in “hot pursuit,” & only use reasonable force (never justified to use deadly force for property).
e. Discipline – Parents
are privileged to use reasonable force to discipline their child.
B. Consent R2T §892: Willingness for conduct
to occur. May be manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor. If words or conduct are reasonably
understood as intending consent, they are effective as consent.
a. Effect
Of Consent R2T§ 892A – (1) If consented to, no tort claim. (2) Consent must be given by
one who has capacity to consent, or by person empowered to consent for him, and consent must be to the actual conduct.
C. Privileges not based on Plaintiff’s
Conduct
a. Arrests and Searches
- Officers have the privilege to enter land to execute a search or arrest warrant.
b. Public
Rights - Any person has a right to enter a public utility, and cannot be held as a trespasser for exercising that right (civil
rights). The privilege to enter land to reclaim goods of one’s own
c. Necessity (public & private necessity)
1. Public Necessity – R2T §196: One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is,
or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster.
a. Surocco
v. Geary
– Fire spreading, would have destroyed P’s house. Fire chief blows up P’s house to stop the fire from spreading.
Reasonable for him to do so. Not liable.
b. Wegner
v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co. –
apprehension of a criminal; police caused damage to P’s house. There was a public necessity,
but an innocent shouldn’t bear the costs. City to pay back the damages, but officers not personally liable.
2. Private necessity R2T §197: (1) Privileged
to enter or remain on other’s land if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor,
or his land, chattels. (2) Private necessity may privilege the use or destruction of private
property but the user/destroyer must compensate (except if the threat of harm that forced the entry was caused
by tortious conduct of the landowner).
a. Vincent
v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
– Storm, ship would have been blown away. So ship was moored to dock, and b/c of storm, kept hitting the dock, causing
damage to it. D has privilege to use the dock (private necessity), but he must pay for the damage (b/c he got a benefit while
P was harmed).
